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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-1647
___________
XIU-YAN ZHU,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A098-715-485)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Eugene Pugliese
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 18, 2010

Before: FUENTES, VANASKIE and VAN ANTWERPEN , Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 19, 2010)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Xiu-Yan Zhu seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final
order of removal. In its order, the BIA affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision

to deny Zhu’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We will deny the petition.
I.
Zhu is a native and citizen of China from Fujian Province. She arrived in the
United States on or about December 19, 2004. On December 23, 2004, the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear charging her with
removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Zhu admitted the factual allegations in
the Notice and conceded removability. On January 11, 2007, Zhu filed an amended
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT, claiming
past persecution and fear of future persecution for practicing Falun Gong, which is
outlawed in China. She also claimed that she fears persecution for violating the country’s
family planning policy.1
The IJ denied Zhu’s application for relief, finding Zhu’s testimony that she is a
practitioner of Falun Gong lacked credibility. The IJ noted that Zhu was uncomfortable
answering questions about the discipline and appeared to know little about it. With
regard to corroborating evidence, while Zhu’s husband testified at the hearing that he
witnessed his wife practice Falun Gong regularly, the IJ found his testimony
unpersuasive. The IJ also determined that Zhu failed to provide adequate documentary
evidence substantiating her fear of persecution for having violated China’s family
1

Zhu married after entering the United States and gave birth to a daughter in October
2006.
2

planning policy.
On February 10, 2009, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Zhu’s
appeal. The BIA reviewed only the IJ’s denial of Zhu’s Falun Gong claim, determining
that she waived review of her additional claim that she would be persecuted under the
Chinese family planning policy.
II.
This Court has authority to review final orders of removal. See 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a). “[W]hen the BIA both adopts the findings of the IJ and discusses some of the
bases for the IJ’s decision, we have authority to review the decisions of both the IJ and
the BIA.” Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F. 3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004). The BIA’s factual
determinations are upheld if they are supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481
(1992). We review an adverse credibility determination under the substantial evidence
standard. Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2004). Under this deferential
standard of review, this Court must uphold a credibility determination unless “any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Gao v.Ashcroft,
299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting INA § 242(b)(4)(B)).2
2

Because Zhu filed her asylum application after May 11, 2005, the provisions of the
REAL ID Act governing credibility determinations in asylum applications apply. See
Chukwu v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 484 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2007). Under the REAL
ID Act, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on inconsistencies, inherent
implausibilities, inaccuracies, and other factors, without regard to whether they relate to
the heart of an applicant’s claim. See INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii).
3

We conclude that the adverse credibility determination in this case is supported by
substantial evidence as the hearing transcript shows that Zhu had a difficult time
providing details about her practice of Falun Gong. We agree with the IJ’s and BIA’s
observations that Zhu was often non-responsive when asked to describe what the practice
entailed. At other times, her answers were delayed. Specifically, the hearing transcript
reveals that while Zhu knew certain cursory information about Falun Gong such as its
founder, she could not adequately describe key elements of the discipline, including the
movements associated with meditation.3 (A.R. 107-8; 115-16). Although applicants for
asylum need not display “the knowledge of a seminarian,” see Mezvrishvili v. Att'y Gen.,
467 F.3d 1292, 1296 (11th Cir. 2006), we agree that Zhu’s inability to describe basic
elements of her practice undermines her claim that she has been regular practitioner of the
discipline since April 2003. (A.R. 91).
The BIA also upheld the IJ’s adverse credibility ruling based on Zhu’s inconsistent
statements regarding her alleged September 2004 arrest for practicing Falun Gong. (Id. at
2.) Although perhaps less significant to the evaluation of her credibility than her inability
to adequately explain her practice of Falun Gong, we find that the IJ’s adverse credibility
determination is supported by “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the
record considered as a whole.” Gao, 299 F.3d at 272.
3

Although Zhu describes the IJ’s evaluation of her testimony as mostly an evaluation
of her demeanor, for reasons discussed herein, the record shows that his evaluation
encompassed more than Zhu’s inability to answer questions quickly, noting that she
displayed an overall lack of knowledge about the discipline.
4

We also find no error in the conclusions of the IJ and BIA that Zhu failed to
provide sufficient corroborating evidence of her ongoing practice of Falun Gong. In
denying asylum based on a lack of corroboration, the BIA and/or IJ must: (1) identify the
facts for which it is reasonable to expect corroboration; (2) inquire as to whether the
applicant has provided information corroborating the relevant facts; and, if he or she has
not; and (3) analyze of whether the applicant has adequately explained his or her failure to
do so. Toure v. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2006); Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239
F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001).
The IJ reasonably expected Zhu to submit affidavits or some evidence that she has
practiced Falun Gong since her arrival in the United States. However, Zhu presented only
the testimony of her husband to support the claim. He was not a particularly helpful
witness. While he claimed that Zhu practices Falun Gong three or four times a week, he
could not offer any details about his wife’s practice. (A.R. 120-21.) The BIA reasonably
agreed that this lack of corroborating evidence failed to satisfy Zhu’s burden of proof.
As Zhu did not meet her burden of proof on her asylum claim, her claim for
withholding of removal necessarily fails.4 See Yu v. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 346, 349 (3d
Cir. 2008). We will deny the petition for review.

4

Because Zhu has provided no argument in her opening brief challenging either the
BIA’s denial of her CAT claim or its finding that she waived review of her claim that she
would be persecuted under China’s family planning policy, we will not review those
claims. See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005).
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